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STATE OF NEW YO= 
SUPREME COURT 
In The Matter of ART€€UR MONTGOMERY, 
Petitioner, 
-against- 
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Respondent, 
- -  
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Tam 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-13-ST4326 Index No. 6715 -12 
Appearances: Arthur Montgomery 
h a t e  No. 83-A-6495 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Gouverneur CorrectionaI Facility 
P.O. Box 480 
Gouverneur, NY 13642-0370 
Eric T. Schneideman 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Brian J. O'Donnell, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Gouverneur Correctional Facility, has commenced the 
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated October 
1 1, 201 1 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner's current 
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incarceration is for the following crimes: 2"d degree murder, two cbunts (each 25 years to 
life); 1" degree attempted robbery, two counts (each 5 to 15 years); promoting prison 
contraband, two counts (each 2 % to 5 years). All are being served concurrently to each 
other, Among the many arguments set forth in the petition; petitioner points out that this is 
his fourth appearance before the Parole Board. He indicates that in I989 he earned his GED 
degree while at Green Haven Correctional Facility. He then entered Dutchess Community 
CoIlege. However before he could complete his studies, he was transferred to Auburn 
Correctional Facility. He then enrolled in Cayuga Community ColIege where, in 1993, he 
earned anhsociates Degree in liberal arts. After being transferred to Sing Sing Correctional 
Facility he completed two more years of education and earned a Bachelors Degree in 
behavioral science from Mercy College. In ZOO7 he completed ASAT and ART, phases one, 
two and three. In 2008-2009 he worked in the prison law jibrary at FrankIin Correctional 
Facility. He taught HIV classes and worked in the prison tailor shop, and has held various 
jobs and completed various programs. He indicates that he has written six novels since 2003 
and is working on an autobiography and a book on bullying. He submitted what he refers to 
as a "Ietter of remorse'', which chronicles portions of his life, The petitioner criticizes the 
Parole Board for failure to consider his many accomplishments. In his view the Parole Board 
faiied to engage in a risk and needs assessment, as required under 20 1 1 amendments to the 
Executive Law L 20 1 1 ch 62, Part Cy Subpart A, fi 3 8 4 ,  amending Executive Law 259- 
c 141). He indicates that the Parole Board did not have his sentencing minutes before it, but 
that in any event the sentencing judge did not recommend that he be held beyond the 
minimum term of his sentence. In his view, the Board failed to consider the appropriate 
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factors under Executive Law 259-i. Rather, it focused almost entirely on the serious nature 
of his crimes. 
Counsel for the respondent argues that the ParoIe Board satisfied all of the 
requirements of Executive Law 2594 (2) IC>. He points out that during the parole interview, 
the Parole Board discussed petitioner’s pre-sentence investigation report, the instant offenses, 
his criminal history, his programming, disciplinary record and plans upon release. He 
indicates that the inmate status report reviewed the foregoing factors, as wel1. Counsel 
maintains that the Parole Board engaged in the equivalent of a risk arid needs analysis as 
required under Executive Law 259-c (4) by evaluating such factors as petitioner’s 
institutional record, program goals, accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education training9 work assignments, therapy, interpersonal relationships with staff  and 
inmates, and release plans. As part of the foregoing argument, it is asserted that the inmate 
status report, in effect, incorporates risk and needs principles in its analysis of the 
appropriateness of petitioner’s release. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
“After a careful review of your record, your personal interview, 
and due deliberation, it is the determination afthis panel that, if 
released at this the, there is a reasonable probability that you 
would not live at Iiberty without violating the law, your release 
at this time is incompatible with the welfare and safety of the 
community, and will so deprecate the seriousness of this crime 
as to undermine respect for law. This decision is based upon the 
following factors: You stand convicted of the following serious 
offenses of murder in the second degree, two counts, attempted 
robbery in the first degree, two counts, and promoting phon 
contraband. In the first instance, you caused the death of a 
victim by stabbing her numerous times in the neck, chest, 
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abdomen, and back. This was a pre-arranged meeting where 
you intended to steal money and cocaine. You continue to get 
tickets in prison, the latest being a Tier 111 for a sex offense. 
Consideration has been given to you program completion, 
however, your release at this time is denied.” 
Pade Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept., 
20041; Matter of ColIado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept., 
20011). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part 
of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention Matter of Silmm 
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801; see also Matter of Graziano v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367,1369 
[3d Dept., 201 11). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the 
discretionary determination made by the ParoIe Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York 
State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 L3rd Dept., ZOOZ]). 
As relevant here, the 20 1 1 amendments to the Executive Law & L 20 1 1 ch 62, Part 
C, Subpart A, 8 3 8-b, et seq.) made two changes with respect to how parole determinations 
are made. First, Executive Law Q 259-c was revised to eliminate mention of Division of 
Parole guidelines 9 NYCFtR 800 1.3 [a]), in favor of requiring the Division of Parole to 
rely upon criteria that would place greater emphasis on assessing the degree to which inmates 
have been rehabilitated, and the probability that they would be able to remain crime-free if 
, 
reIeased &.g Executive Law 259-c [4]). Said section now recites: “[tlhe state board of 
parole shall [] (4) establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as 
required by law. Such written procedures shalt incorporate risk and needs principles to 
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measure the rehabilitation of persons a p p e g  before the board, the likelihood of success 
of such persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining 
which inmates may be released to parole supervision” (Executive Law 2 5 9-c [4 3 ,  enacted in 
L 201 1 ch 62, Part C ,  Subpart A, 0 38-b). This amendment was made effective six months 
after its adoption on March 3 1,20 I 1, that is, on October I, 20 1 1 (see L 20 1 1, ch 62, Part C, 
Subpart A, 8 49-[fl). In the second change, Executive 259-i (2) (c)  was amended to 
incorporate into one section the eight factors which the Parole Board was to consider in 
making release determinations (see L 2011 ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, 5 28-f-1). This 
amendment was effective immediately upon its adoption on March 3 1,201 1 (see L 201 1, 
ck 62, Part C, Subpart A, 5 49). Notably however, it did not result in a substantive change 
in the criteria which the Parole Board &odd consider in rendering its decision. 
Andrea W. Evans, the Commissioner of DOCCS, implemented the provisions of 
Executive Law 9 259-c (4) through issuance of a DOCCS Memorandum dated October 5 ,  
201 1. She indicated h the Memorandum that members of the Parole Board were working 
With DOCCS staffto develop a transition accountability plan, or “TAP”. It is indicated that 
TAP incorporates risk and needs principles, and will provide a meaningful measurement of 
an inmate’s rehabilitation. According to Comissioner Evans, the TAP instrument would 
replace the inmate status report. In the same Memorandum, it is indicated that the Parole 
Board had been trained in usage of the Compas Risk and Ne& Assessment tool, so that 
members of the Board could understand the interplay between the Compas instrument and 
the TAP instrument. 
Of note in this instance, the Third Department Appellate Division recently had 
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opportunity to rule on a case having dose similarities to the case at bar. In Matter of Garfield 
v Evans AD3d -9 20 I3 NY Slip Op 5029, [July 3 ,  2013]), the inmate’s parole 
interview occurred in October 20 1 1, just after the effective date of Executive Law 8 259-c 
(4). As here, the inmate alleged that the Parole Board failedto utilize the COMPAS Risk and 
Needs Assessment instrument‘ ~ The Appellate Division stated: 
“Significantly, Executive Law 5 25% (4) requires that the 
Board ‘establish written procedures fur its use in making parole 
, decisions as required by law,’ and the Board acknowledges that 
the statute requires it to incorporate risk mil needs principles 
into its decision-making process. According to the record, the 
Board was trained in the use of the COMPAS instrument prior 
to petitioner‘s hearing. Moreover, the Board acknowledges that 
it has used the CUMPAS instrument since February 2012 and 
will use it for petitioner’s next appearance. Under these 
circumstances, we find no justification for the Board’s failure to 
use the COMPAS instrument at petitioner‘s October 2011 
hearing. Accordingly, we agree with petitioner that he is 
entitled to a new hearing.[]”@.). 
The Garfield case is directly applicable to the situation at bar, In this instance, there 
is no evidence in the record ha t  the Parole Board utilized either the Compas instrument or 
the TAP instrument. Nor did the Parole Board make mention of a risk and needs analysis, 
either d-uring the parole intewiew, or within the parole deterinination. Thus, in this respect, 
there is nothing to distinguish the F a d e  Board’s review here fiom the process generally 
employed by the Parole Board prior to the 201 1 amendment of Executive Law 5 259-c (4). 
The Court concludes that the petition must be granted, the October 1 1,20 1 I determination 
annulled, and the petitioner granted a new parole interview. 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
‘Referred to in the petition as the “ Compass factors”. 
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petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, 
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is granted; and it is 
ORDERED, that the October I 1,20 1 1 determination of the Parole Board is annulled 
and the matter remitted to the Board of Parole for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
th is  Court's decision. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decisiodordewljudgment and delivery of this decisiodorderljudgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable 
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
I 
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